Keeping Pakistan From Falling Apart
STEPHEN P. COHEN | 03 MAY 2011
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The pro-democracy uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East have moved crisis-ridden Pakistan out of the global spotlight. This is unfortunate, because Pakistan's timid democratic resurgence faces a variety of obstacles, and its stability is more uncertain than ever before. To expect that Pakistan may soon experience a similar democratic transformation is not only excessively optimistic, but also ignores recent history: Pakistan exhausted its own "Arab Street" moment in 2007, when Gen. Pervez Musharraf was forced to resign following demonstrations by a diverse and vibrant civil society movement led by Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry.

That was the last time Pakistani liberals were seen on the streets. Since then, public spaces and opinion have fallen into the hands of extremists. In December 2007, months after she returned from exile, former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was assassinated while campaigning for the country's first democratic elections following almost a decade of military rule. Her victory had seemed certain and would have given the country an experienced and charismatic leader. The more recent assassinations of Salman Taseer, the governor of Punjab province, and Shahbaz Bhatti, the federal minister for minorities, both targeted for opposing the adoption of a new blasphemy law, highlight how extremists have succeeded in influencing and constraining the political agenda in Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi, but also in Rawalpindi, the army's headquarters.


Pakistan's liberal intelligentsia is hostage to two undemocratic forces that have steadily risen to power. On the one hand, moderates face the wrath of conservative Islamists and their radical fringe supporters, who condemn the government for its permissive stance on the deadly U.S. drone strikes on the Afghan borderlands. These groups have expanded their popular support in the aftermath of the crisis centered on Raymond Davis, a CIA contractor detained by Pakistani authorities for almost two months on charges of killing two civilians last January in Lahore.

On the other hand, Pakistani moderates remain constrained by the authoritarian impulses of the military, which has formally handed over power to President Asif Ali Zardari and his civilian administration but continues to effectively control the country's destiny, from its economy to its foreign policy. Remaining opposition voices, like that of journalist and former Information Minister Sherry Rehman, now operate in an environment of fear, their lives constantly under threat by extremists.

The moderates' withdrawal from the public square is perhaps the most disquieting development in Pakistan in recent times, setting it fundamentally apart from the positive developments in the Arab world, if not quite on the opposite extreme to them. Liberal democratic Pakistanis are now on the defensive, with troubling implications for a country already facing a variety of challenges, from a crumbling state and governance structure to an immense demographic transition.

Too Important to Fail

The current scenario is worrisome, but the future could be even worse. Over the next five years, Pakistan's success as a stable state, measured along any dimension, is far from guaranteed, and in fact, the "normalization" of Pakistan remains doubtful. The most probable scenario is one of Pakistan "muddling through" rapidly deteriorating domestic socio-economic, political and regional security challenges.

But unlike with other failed or failing states, the United States cannot afford to just ignore Pakistan or let it fail comprehensively. There are four reasons why radical disengagement is at odds with American interests in the region.

First, on the immediate horizon, there is Afghanistan. The success of American plans to withdraw U.S. troops following 2014 and to ensure security for a non-Taliban regime in Kabul until then depends not only on Pakistan's willingness to assist in this mission, but also on its military and political capacity to do so. A secure Afghanistan requires a stable and preferably moderate regime in Pakistan. In truth, the problem is less one of a "trust deficit" than of a verification deficit, with both sides suspicious of the motives and actions of the other in Afghanistan and along the Afghanistan-Pakistan borderlands.

Second, some of Pakistan's peripheral regions have become a safe haven for a variety of extremist and terrorist organizations that have expanded their area of operations far beyond Pakistan and South Asia. The most glaring case is that of the Lashkar-e-Taiba, whose emerging international profile and links to al-Qaida have led it to target Mumbai in 2008 and possibly to attempt an attack on New York's Times Square in 2010. A failed Pakistan would only increase these actors' capacity to operate internationally.

Third, Pakistan is just "too nuclear" to fail. Its nuclear weapons program remains out of the purview of the nonproliferation regime, and while the risks of its stockpile falling into the hands of terrorists are often exaggerated, it has a horrible track record in terms of horizontal proliferation to rogue states (.pdf), including Iran, North Korea and Libya. The same applies to its persistent conflict with India: A nuclear holocaust in South Asia is an improbable outcome, but the two countries have fought four wars, and a collapsed Pakistani state would create immense political chaos on the subcontinent.

Finally, Pakistan is not Somalia: It is just too big and too central to be allowed to fail and plunge into anarchy. The United States cannot afford to ignore Pakistan, due to its immense size, with the world's second-largest Muslim population, and its vital geopolitical location between China, India, Iran and Afghanistan. Pakistan may not possess any significant natural resources, but it is at the heart of several strategic energy and transportation corridors between South and Central Asia and the Middle East. Beijing, for example, immensely prizes the access Pakistan offers to the Indian Ocean, which promises to be a major strategic theater for both Asia and the emerging global order in the 21st century.

Four Major Challenges

If letting Pakistan fail is not an option, what needs to be done? What challenges does the country face, and how can we expect its future to look in five to seven years? These were the main questions addressed in a recent project I coordinated at the Brookings Institution with a group of 14 American, European, Pakistani and Indian experts. The group identified a set of 19 crucial factors, distributed among four clusters.
The first cluster includes domestic concerns regarding Pakistan's demographics, education and economy. The idea of the Pakistani middle class as a bastion of democracy is a dangerous myth, given that historically middle classes have at times supported fascist and totalitarian movements. In Pakistan, in particular, anti-Americanism is on the rise, feeding anti-democratic tendencies among the educated urban population and the military.

At the same time, Pakistan faces the unsettling impact of a tremendous population boom paralleled by rapid urbanization and a weak education system. Half of the 180 million Pakistanis are now under 20 years of age. Meanwhile, the population has tripled since 1960 and is likely to grow by another 85 million in the next 20 years.

The collapsing economy further complicates the picture. GDP growth slowed to an abysmal 1.6 percent during the recession of 2008 and is estimated to reach a mere 2.6 percent in 2011. Inflation has skyrocketed, surpassing 20 percent in 2008 and projected to remain above 10 percent for another few years. Unemployment has now reached a 20-year high of 14 percent, and is expected to increase until 2013. With the bureaucracy and other state structures largely incapacitated and unable to respond to these massive demographic and economic challenges, the country's effective governance and ultimate viability now depend on a combination of massive foreign assistance and the remittances of overseas Pakistanis, which together totaled $13 billion in 2010.

A second cluster of factors shaping Pakistan's future revolves around the collective identity of its citizens, who identify with and act on the basis of their regional, ethnic and religious identities. The idea of a secular, moderate and democratic Pakistan as promoted by Pakistan's founding statesman, Muhammed Ali Jinnah, is under increasing attack from regionalist and ethno-linguistic groups, as well as from radical Islamists and other sectarian extremists. Unless the government undertakes a radical transformation to support the idea of a liberal Pakistan by word and deed, we will see a continued erosion of the moral authority of the state and an increasingly fractious debate over the existential purpose of Pakistan.

While unlikely to endanger the stability of the state, ethno-linguistic movements and other centrifugal forces -- especially in Balochistan, Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa -- have been on the rise and could contribute to undermining the legitimacy of the government and the army. Somewhat more likely is the possibility of a revival of Pashtun nationalism -- not from the left, in the tradition of the secular Awami National Party, but from the right, using the rhetoric and organization of the Pakistani Taliban. In the end, it is not Islam or religion per se that is the problem, but the way in which religion is exploited by various political actors, including, at times, the moderate political parties and the military. The genie of ethno-sectarian radicalism has now escaped from the bottle, and much of Pakistan's future will be determined by the efforts and degree of success achieved in containing these groups and their rapidly expanding popular support bases.

The third cluster of factors shaping Pakistan's future concerns "state coherence," meaning the ability of Pakistanis to work for a common goal -- or against a common enemy -- and the ways in which various actors and institutions facilitate or oppose this. The capacity of the Pakistani state to ensure even the most basic governance has eroded, and it has yet to regain the integrity and effectiveness it had 40 or 50 years ago, even though it is now called on to do much more. This is aggravated by the army's attempts to carry out functions ordinarily executed by civilians, thus negatively affecting the state's legitimacy and capacity to tax, educate or maintain law and order. The military's behavior appears to have changed since 2007, allowing Zardari some room for maneuver. But it is important to recall that the army did not withdraw to the barracks because of a shift in its core praetorian ethos, which remains fundamentally committed to a tutelary and interventionist role.

The consequences are disastrous for future stability and governance, translating into a chronic incapacity to integrate security, political, economic and administrative requirements in a central and long-term decision-making process. The state's weakness is reflected in Pakistan's low ranking on almost every governance indicator -- crime, corruption and tax evasion, for instance -- as well as by its presence in the Failed State Index, where it just entered the Top 10 and acquired "critical" status.

Basic reform has to reduce the military's disproportionate and increasingly influential role in governance, and that may be very hard to achieve. Even if civilian competence is allowed to grow, it will take years, if not decades, and will require a long period of peace before it is up to the task. The media, judiciary and political parties all have an important role to play, but also suffer from their own internal weaknesses. They are thus, by themselves, incapable of reversing the political pattern of alternation between weak, unstable democratic governments and a benign authoritarianism, usually led by the army. This is likely to continue to erode Pakistan's governance over the next five years.

A final cluster looks at Pakistan's international environment. While Pakistanis may have an exaggerated view of the pernicious role played by outsiders, four external actors and two trends do shape Pakistan to a worrisome degree.

First, of the many factors complicating any forecasts of Pakistan's future, Afghanistan is certainly near the top. It affects relations with the United States and has a potential influence on Pakistan's Pashtun population. A Taliban victory there would be regarded by Pakistan's domestic Islamic extremists as a civilizational victory. For its part, the Pakistani military will also resist giving up its immense ambitions in Afghanistan, including significant influence -- if not control -- over Kabul in order to achieve its longstanding desire to balance India there.

Second, with regard to Washington, relations with the United States have deteriorated drastically, as has the image of the U.S. in Pakistan. What is euphemistically called a "trust deficit" will continue to constrain another euphemism: the U.S.-Pakistan "partnership." Conspiracy theories about U.S. collusion with India and Israel to weaken Pakistan and seize its nuclear weapons are widely shared even at the highest echelons of the army. A recent poll found that, when asked to name Pakistan's major enemy, 59 percent of Pakistanischose the U.S., ahead of other perceived threats, including India (52 percent), the Taliban (34 percent) and al-Qaida (21 percent).


Third, China has established itself as the most influential player in Islamabad. Its popularity among elites and in most of the provinces, its economic penetration, and its comprehensive support for the security establishment in the form of military hardware and nuclear technology have translated into an ever-increasing leverage over Islamabad. This was most recently symbolized by the visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to Islamabad in December 2010.

Finally, Pakistani paranoia regarding India is likely to persist. The management of Pakistan's relations with India has proved to be a source of conflict between the country's civilian and military leaderships and has historically been a leading driver of regime change, with the army often regarding civilian leaders as being too soft toward India. Pakistan's ethnic cohesion is also strained by differences among its various provinces in the priority they accord to Kashmir and other conflicts with India, with Punjab normally being the most hawkish. Pakistan would probably be better off seeking a long-term accommodation with India today, before it grows weaker and India stronger. But some in Pakistan still believe that the use of terrorism, carried out under the umbrella of a threat of nuclear escalation, will keep India off balance.

Two additional external trends will influence Pakistan's future: globalization and Islamabad's growing nuclear arsenal, which seems unconstrained by financial shortfall or strategic logic. The two are intertwined. Pakistan received almost all of its nuclear technology from other countries and took advantage of globalization to create purchasing networks that stretched around the world. It subsequently used these networks to share its nuclear technology with several customers. Pakistan's increasingly international profile indicates that more such incoming and outgoing flows of people, knowledge and technologies are to be expected, and not all of them will have benign intentions.

Pakistan in 2017: Six Scenarios

Given these four clusters, what can we expect for Pakistan on a five- to seven-year horizon? The study identifies a total of six scenarios, two of them being more likely and four others less probable.

The most likely scenario is "more of the same": an establishment-dominated Pakistan muddling through the various challenges and threats described above, with limited and erratic support from the outside. The military might take over, but only temporarily to effect short-term fixes. It will neither encourage nor tolerate deep reform, however, and civilians will be content with a limited political role. While seemingly sustainable in the short term, this effective surrendering to the volatilities of contingency could, in the long run, lead to a visible decline of Pakistan's integrity as a state.

The second likely scenario is that of "parallel Pakistans," in which the state would carry on as a recognizable central government, but some of the provinces and regions would succumb to centrifugal forces -- not in the form of a formal breakup, but on three latent dimensions: local political regime type; specific governance, economy and education models; and policies toward Islamist and separatist forces. De jure, Pakistan would live on, but de facto we would witness the emergence of political structures that contest, clash and overlap with the sovereignty of the federal center.

The four less likely scenarios include "democratic consolidation" based on an agreement between the two dominant parties, with the army accepting a permanently recessed role; "breakaway and fragmentation" after the disintegration of the army, either through a war or ethnic and sectarian differences; "civil or military authoritarianism" based on a centralized modernizing agenda or charismatic leader; and an "army-led revolution," along the lines of the Turkish or Indonesian experiences.

Overall, the interplay between the contested fields within Pakistan and the integrity of the Pakistani state will be determinative. It will be possible to measure this tension by Islamabad's future willingness and capacity to correct course and reverse trends along six crucial dimensions: dealing quickly with economic issues; rebuilding state institutions; creating effective and coherent governance at the top; breaking the cycle of the "begging bowl" dependency; avoiding new crises with India; and resisting the temptation to further appease Islamists.

A Diverse Menu of Policy Options

The fact that increasingly radical policy suggestions for Pakistan are getting more attention and leverage in Washington is a worrisome indication of how close the United States is to giving up on the country. Two suggestions stand out: Ambassador Robert Blackwill's "plan B," calling for a de facto partition of Afghanistan, which would necessarily lead to a greater Pashtunistan with territories carved out on the Pakistani side of the border and Ralph Peters' provocative map that redesigns the political borders of the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, reducing Pakistan to a rump of Punjab and parts of Sindh. Others talk of a strike against Pakistan should another terror attack be launched from its territory on the United States.

Instead of thinking along these lines, the United States should explore alternative scenarios and design a long-term Pakistan policy that is more than a mere derivation of Washington's immediate priorities in Afghanistan. For all the reasons and scenarios developed above, Pakistan cannot just be wished away: If nothing is done now, it will probably re-emerge as an even bigger problem and a more troubled country in the future.

The Western powers, Japan and India therefore need to develop a concerted strategy that will strengthen reform-minded and democratic forces in Pakistan, encourage the military to remain in a recessed role, help improve the Pakistani economy and generate more resources to address vital domestic needs.

This does not mean that the United States must involve itself in running the country or that it should get entangled in negotiations between Pakistan's military and political actors, which would be both costly and risky. There are good intermediate options, such as Thomas Friedman's proposal to disengage from South Asia and focus on offshore balancingbased on punctual "corrective" interventions. Other options worth exploring on the policy menu include encouraging India to supplant Pakistan in Afghanistan; containing Pakistan regionally; facilitating an India-Pakistan settlement on Kashmir; or just continuing the current cluster of policies. A failed or fragmented Pakistan, though, is not an option and should be kept off the menu as long as possible.

It is hard to be optimistic that the West and the United States will get both Afghanistan and Pakistan "right," that India will suddenly pursue a conciliatory policy with regard to its neighbor or that the Pakistani elite -- especially the military -- will have both the intent and capacity to undertake a program of deep reforms. That leaves the current, and perhaps the least worst, cluster of policies. When it comes to Pakistan, we must hope for the best, but that should not keep us from at least thinking about the worst.