Monday, January 4, 2021
Foreign Intelligence Infiltration and Threats to Australia's Economy and Security
https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/nov/08/in-plain-sight-how-an-alleged-chinese-spy-tried-to-build-an-australian-business-empire
Thursday, August 27, 2020
Protecting Australia's sovereignty; https://www.skynews.com.au/details/_6184847285001
https://www.skynews.com.au/details/_6184847285001
Foreign interference and threat to Australia's sovereignty; great initiative by the Federal Government
https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/they-can-be-cancelled-commonwealth-to-review-states-overseas-agreements-20200826-p55pmt.html
Hunting the Phoenix by ASPI; today's global challenges
https://www.aspi.org.au/index.php/report/hunting-phoenix
Biodata and Biotechnology; challenges and opportunities for Australia
https://www.aspi.org.au/report/biodata-and-biotechnology-opportunity-and-challenges-australia
Saturday, May 7, 2011
STRATFOR BOOK
The Devolution of Jihadism: From Al Qaeda to Wider Movement
By Scott Stewart
U.S. President Barack Obama appeared in a hastily arranged televised address the night of May 1, 2011, to inform the world that U.S. counterterrorism forces had located and killed Osama bin Laden. The operation, which reportedly happened in the early hours of May 2 local time, targeted a compound in Abbottabad, a city located some 31 miles north of Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital. The nighttime raid resulted in a brief firefight that left bin Laden and several others dead. A U.S. helicopter reportedly was damaged in the raid and later destroyed by U.S. forces. Obama reported that no U.S. personnel were lost in the operation. After a brief search of the compound, the U.S. forces left with bin Laden’s body and presumably anything else that appeared to have intelligence value. From Obama’s carefully scripted speech, it would appear that the U.S. conducted the operation unilaterally with no Pakistani assistance — or even knowledge.
As evidenced by the spontaneous celebrations that erupted in Washington, New York and across the United States, the killing of bin Laden has struck a chord with many Americans. This was true not only of those who lost family members as a result of the attack, but of those who were vicariously terrorized and still vividly recall the deep sense of fear they felt the morning of Sept. 11, 2001, as they watched aircraft strike the World Trade Center Towers and saw those towers collapse on live television, and then heard reports of the Pentagon being struck by a third aircraft and of a fourth aircraft prevented from being used in another attack when it crashed in rural Pennsylvania. As that fear turned to anger, a deep-seated thirst for vengeance led the United States to invade Afghanistan in October 2001 and to declare a “global war on terrorism.”
Because of this sense of fulfilled vengeance, the death of bin Laden will certainly be one of those events that people will remember, like the 9/11 attacks themselves. In spite of the sense of justice and closure the killing of bin Laden brings, however, his death will likely have very little practical impact on the jihadist movement. More important will be the reaction of the Pakistani government to the operation and the impact it has on U.S.-Pakistani relations.
Foundations
To understand the impact of bin Laden’s death on the global jihadist movement, we must first remember that the phenomenon of jihadism is far wider than just the al Qaeda core leadership of bin Laden and his closest followers. Rather than a monolithic entity based on the al Qaeda group, jihadism has devolved into a far more diffuse network composed of many different parts. These parts include the core al Qaeda group formerly headed by bin Laden; a network of various regional franchise groups such as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); and last, a broad array of grassroots operatives who are adherents to the jihadist ideology but who are not formally affiliated with the al Qaeda core or one of the regional franchises.
The al Qaeda core always has been a fairly small and elite vanguard. Since 9/11, intense pressure has been placed upon this core organization by the U.S. government and its allies. This pressure has resulted in the death or capture of many al Qaeda cadres and has served to keep the group small due to overriding operational security concerns. This insular group has laid low in Pakistan, and this isolation has significantly degraded its ability to conduct attacks. All of this has caused the al Qaeda core to become primarily an organization that produces propaganda and provides guidance and inspiration to the other jihadist elements rather than an organization focused on conducting operations. While bin Laden and the al Qaeda core have received a great deal of media attention, the core group comprises only a very small portion of the larger jihadist movement.
As STRATFOR has analyzed the war between the jihadist movement and the rest of the world, we have come to view the battlefield as being divided into two distinct parts, the physical battlefield and the ideological battlefield. The post-9/11 assault on the al Qaeda core group hindered its ability to act upon the physical battlefield. For the past several years, they have been limited to fighting on the ideological battlefield, waging a war of propaganda and attempting to promote the ideology of jihadism in an effort to radicalize Muslims and prompt them to act. The danger has always existed that if pressure were taken off this core, it could regroup and return to the physical struggle. But the pressure has been relentless and the group has been unable to return to its pre-9/11 level of operational capability. This has resulted in the grassroots and franchise groups like AQAP taking the lead on the physical battlefield.
As we noted in our annual forecast of the jihadist movement, the al Qaeda core group not only has been eclipsed on the physical battlefield, over the past few years it has been overshadowed on the ideological battlefield as well. Groups such as AQAP have begun setting the tone on the ideological realm — as in its call for Muslims to assume the leaderless resistance model rather than traveling to join groups — and we have seen the al Qaeda core follow the lead of AQAP rather than set the tone themselves. We believe this deference to AQAP is a sign of the al Qaeda core’s weakness, and of its struggle to remain relevant on the ideological battlefield. There also have been many disagreements among various actors in the jihadist movement over doctrinal issues such as targeting foreigners over local security forces and attacks that kill Muslims.
The Emir is Dead, Long Live the Emir
While the al Qaeda core has been marginalized recently, it has practiced good operational security and has been able to protect its apex leadership for nearly 10 years from one of the most intense manhunts in human history. It clearly foresaw the possibility that one of its apex leaders could be taken out and planned accordingly. This means keeping bin Laden and his deputy, Egyptian physician Ayman al-Zawahiri, in different locations and having a succession plan. There is also very little question that al-Zawahiri is firmly in command of the core group. Even prior to bin Laden’s death, many analysts considered al-Zawahiri to be the man in charge of most of the operational aspects of the al Qaeda group — the “chief executive officer,” with bin Laden being more of a figurehead or “chairman of the board.” That said, the intelligence collected during the operation against bin Laden could provide leads to track down other leaders, and this may make them nervous in spite of their efforts to practice good operational security.
Certainly, bin Laden was an important person who was able to raise much funding and who became an international icon following 9/11; because of this, it will be hard to replace him. At the same time, the jihadist movement has weathered the loss of a number of influential individuals, from the assassination of Abdullah Azzam to the arrests of the Blind Sheikh and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Yet in spite of these losses, the ideology has continued, new members have been recruited and new leaders have stepped up to fill the void. Ideologies are far harder to kill than individuals, especially ideologies that encourage their followers to embrace martyrdom whether their leaders are dead or alive. This means that we do not believe the death of bin Laden will result in the death of the global jihadist movement: A man is dead but the ideology lives on.
The Threat
The survival of the ideology of jihadism means the threat of terrorist attacks remains. The good news is that as one moves down the jihadist pyramid from the al Qaeda core to the regional franchises to the grassroots, the level of terrorist tradecraft these individuals possess diminishes and the threat they pose is not as severe. Certainly, grassroots terrorists can and will continue to kill people, but they lack the ability to conduct dramatic, strategic attacks. Thus, though the threat becomes more widespread and harder to guard against, at the same time it becomes less severe.
There obviously will be some concerns regarding some sort of major attack in retribution for bin Laden’s death. Indeed, jihadists have long threatened to conduct attacks over the arrests and deaths of key figures. Analytically, however, the idea that al Qaeda or one of its regional franchise groups has some sort of superattack on standby for activation upon bin Laden’s death is simply not logical. First, the al Qaeda core group has attempted to conduct many attacks against the U.S. homeland following 9/11, as have franchise groups like AQAP. While these plots did not succeed, it was not for lack of trying. Jihadists have also made many empty threats regarding a follow-on to the 9/11 attacks — only to be embarrassed by their inability to follow through. Third, so many plots have been thwarted over the past decade that if the core al Qaeda group or a franchise group had a plan primed and ready to go, it would not sit on it and run the risk of its being discovered and compromised. Instead, it would execute such an attack as soon as it was ready. Furthermore, jihadists — especially those at the grassroots and regional franchise levels — have not demonstrated the sophisticated apparatus required to conduct off-the-shelf planning exhibited by groups like Hezbollah. They generally tend to work on attack plans from scratch and execute those plans when ready.
Undoubtedly, there were jihadists planning attacks on the United States before the death of bin Laden, and there are jihadists planning attacks today. However, these individuals probably would have carried out this planning and any eventual attack — if possible — regardless of bin Laden’s fate. Will groups conducting future attacks claim they were acting in retribution for bin Laden? Probably. Would they have attempted such an attack if he were still alive? Probably.
The potential for low-level impulsive retribution attacks by unprepared individuals or groups directed at American or other Western targets does exist, however. This type of impromptu attack would be more likely a shooting rather than an attack using an explosive device, so there is good reason for the U.S. government to increase security measures around the globe.
The result of all this is that the threat from the global jihadist movement will continue in the short term with no real change. This means that pressure needs to be maintained on the al Qaeda core so it will not have the chance to recover, retool and return to attacking the United States. Pressure also needs to be maintained on the jihadist franchise groups so they cannot mature operationally to the point where they become transnational, strategic threats. Finally, efforts must continue to identify grassroots jihadists before they can launch attacks against soft targets. But these same imperatives also were valid last week; nothing has really changed at the tactical level.
Where the big change may be happening is at the political level. That bin Laden was located in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province (formerly known as the North-West Frontier Province) did not come as a surprise — STRATFOR has discussed this likelihood since 2005. We have also discussed the distrust and suspicion between the U.S. and Pakistan — which was clearly evidenced by the unilateral U.S. action in this case. The significant thing to watch for is the reaction of the Pakistani government and public to the raid. In the past, the Pakistani government has found creative ways of displaying its displeasure with the actions of the U.S. government — like manipulating the Pakistani public into the November 1979 sacking and destruction of the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad. While the average Pakistani may not care too much about bin Laden, public sentiment is running very high against U.S. operations in Pakistan, and this operation could serve to inflame such sentiments. These two elements mean that the coming weeks could be a very tense time for U.S. diplomatic and commercial interests in that country
The Devolution of Jihadism: From Al Qaeda to Wider Movement
By Scott Stewart
U.S. President Barack Obama appeared in a hastily arranged televised address the night of May 1, 2011, to inform the world that U.S. counterterrorism forces had located and killed Osama bin Laden. The operation, which reportedly happened in the early hours of May 2 local time, targeted a compound in Abbottabad, a city located some 31 miles north of Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital. The nighttime raid resulted in a brief firefight that left bin Laden and several others dead. A U.S. helicopter reportedly was damaged in the raid and later destroyed by U.S. forces. Obama reported that no U.S. personnel were lost in the operation. After a brief search of the compound, the U.S. forces left with bin Laden’s body and presumably anything else that appeared to have intelligence value. From Obama’s carefully scripted speech, it would appear that the U.S. conducted the operation unilaterally with no Pakistani assistance — or even knowledge.
As evidenced by the spontaneous celebrations that erupted in Washington, New York and across the United States, the killing of bin Laden has struck a chord with many Americans. This was true not only of those who lost family members as a result of the attack, but of those who were vicariously terrorized and still vividly recall the deep sense of fear they felt the morning of Sept. 11, 2001, as they watched aircraft strike the World Trade Center Towers and saw those towers collapse on live television, and then heard reports of the Pentagon being struck by a third aircraft and of a fourth aircraft prevented from being used in another attack when it crashed in rural Pennsylvania. As that fear turned to anger, a deep-seated thirst for vengeance led the United States to invade Afghanistan in October 2001 and to declare a “global war on terrorism.”
Because of this sense of fulfilled vengeance, the death of bin Laden will certainly be one of those events that people will remember, like the 9/11 attacks themselves. In spite of the sense of justice and closure the killing of bin Laden brings, however, his death will likely have very little practical impact on the jihadist movement. More important will be the reaction of the Pakistani government to the operation and the impact it has on U.S.-Pakistani relations.
Foundations
To understand the impact of bin Laden’s death on the global jihadist movement, we must first remember that the phenomenon of jihadism is far wider than just the al Qaeda core leadership of bin Laden and his closest followers. Rather than a monolithic entity based on the al Qaeda group, jihadism has devolved into a far more diffuse network composed of many different parts. These parts include the core al Qaeda group formerly headed by bin Laden; a network of various regional franchise groups such as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); and last, a broad array of grassroots operatives who are adherents to the jihadist ideology but who are not formally affiliated with the al Qaeda core or one of the regional franchises.
The al Qaeda core always has been a fairly small and elite vanguard. Since 9/11, intense pressure has been placed upon this core organization by the U.S. government and its allies. This pressure has resulted in the death or capture of many al Qaeda cadres and has served to keep the group small due to overriding operational security concerns. This insular group has laid low in Pakistan, and this isolation has significantly degraded its ability to conduct attacks. All of this has caused the al Qaeda core to become primarily an organization that produces propaganda and provides guidance and inspiration to the other jihadist elements rather than an organization focused on conducting operations. While bin Laden and the al Qaeda core have received a great deal of media attention, the core group comprises only a very small portion of the larger jihadist movement.
As STRATFOR has analyzed the war between the jihadist movement and the rest of the world, we have come to view the battlefield as being divided into two distinct parts, the physical battlefield and the ideological battlefield. The post-9/11 assault on the al Qaeda core group hindered its ability to act upon the physical battlefield. For the past several years, they have been limited to fighting on the ideological battlefield, waging a war of propaganda and attempting to promote the ideology of jihadism in an effort to radicalize Muslims and prompt them to act. The danger has always existed that if pressure were taken off this core, it could regroup and return to the physical struggle. But the pressure has been relentless and the group has been unable to return to its pre-9/11 level of operational capability. This has resulted in the grassroots and franchise groups like AQAP taking the lead on the physical battlefield.
As we noted in our annual forecast of the jihadist movement, the al Qaeda core group not only has been eclipsed on the physical battlefield, over the past few years it has been overshadowed on the ideological battlefield as well. Groups such as AQAP have begun setting the tone on the ideological realm — as in its call for Muslims to assume the leaderless resistance model rather than traveling to join groups — and we have seen the al Qaeda core follow the lead of AQAP rather than set the tone themselves. We believe this deference to AQAP is a sign of the al Qaeda core’s weakness, and of its struggle to remain relevant on the ideological battlefield. There also have been many disagreements among various actors in the jihadist movement over doctrinal issues such as targeting foreigners over local security forces and attacks that kill Muslims.
The Emir is Dead, Long Live the Emir
While the al Qaeda core has been marginalized recently, it has practiced good operational security and has been able to protect its apex leadership for nearly 10 years from one of the most intense manhunts in human history. It clearly foresaw the possibility that one of its apex leaders could be taken out and planned accordingly. This means keeping bin Laden and his deputy, Egyptian physician Ayman al-Zawahiri, in different locations and having a succession plan. There is also very little question that al-Zawahiri is firmly in command of the core group. Even prior to bin Laden’s death, many analysts considered al-Zawahiri to be the man in charge of most of the operational aspects of the al Qaeda group — the “chief executive officer,” with bin Laden being more of a figurehead or “chairman of the board.” That said, the intelligence collected during the operation against bin Laden could provide leads to track down other leaders, and this may make them nervous in spite of their efforts to practice good operational security.
Certainly, bin Laden was an important person who was able to raise much funding and who became an international icon following 9/11; because of this, it will be hard to replace him. At the same time, the jihadist movement has weathered the loss of a number of influential individuals, from the assassination of Abdullah Azzam to the arrests of the Blind Sheikh and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Yet in spite of these losses, the ideology has continued, new members have been recruited and new leaders have stepped up to fill the void. Ideologies are far harder to kill than individuals, especially ideologies that encourage their followers to embrace martyrdom whether their leaders are dead or alive. This means that we do not believe the death of bin Laden will result in the death of the global jihadist movement: A man is dead but the ideology lives on.
The Threat
The survival of the ideology of jihadism means the threat of terrorist attacks remains. The good news is that as one moves down the jihadist pyramid from the al Qaeda core to the regional franchises to the grassroots, the level of terrorist tradecraft these individuals possess diminishes and the threat they pose is not as severe. Certainly, grassroots terrorists can and will continue to kill people, but they lack the ability to conduct dramatic, strategic attacks. Thus, though the threat becomes more widespread and harder to guard against, at the same time it becomes less severe.
There obviously will be some concerns regarding some sort of major attack in retribution for bin Laden’s death. Indeed, jihadists have long threatened to conduct attacks over the arrests and deaths of key figures. Analytically, however, the idea that al Qaeda or one of its regional franchise groups has some sort of superattack on standby for activation upon bin Laden’s death is simply not logical. First, the al Qaeda core group has attempted to conduct many attacks against the U.S. homeland following 9/11, as have franchise groups like AQAP. While these plots did not succeed, it was not for lack of trying. Jihadists have also made many empty threats regarding a follow-on to the 9/11 attacks — only to be embarrassed by their inability to follow through. Third, so many plots have been thwarted over the past decade that if the core al Qaeda group or a franchise group had a plan primed and ready to go, it would not sit on it and run the risk of its being discovered and compromised. Instead, it would execute such an attack as soon as it was ready. Furthermore, jihadists — especially those at the grassroots and regional franchise levels — have not demonstrated the sophisticated apparatus required to conduct off-the-shelf planning exhibited by groups like Hezbollah. They generally tend to work on attack plans from scratch and execute those plans when ready.
Undoubtedly, there were jihadists planning attacks on the United States before the death of bin Laden, and there are jihadists planning attacks today. However, these individuals probably would have carried out this planning and any eventual attack — if possible — regardless of bin Laden’s fate. Will groups conducting future attacks claim they were acting in retribution for bin Laden? Probably. Would they have attempted such an attack if he were still alive? Probably.
The potential for low-level impulsive retribution attacks by unprepared individuals or groups directed at American or other Western targets does exist, however. This type of impromptu attack would be more likely a shooting rather than an attack using an explosive device, so there is good reason for the U.S. government to increase security measures around the globe.
The result of all this is that the threat from the global jihadist movement will continue in the short term with no real change. This means that pressure needs to be maintained on the al Qaeda core so it will not have the chance to recover, retool and return to attacking the United States. Pressure also needs to be maintained on the jihadist franchise groups so they cannot mature operationally to the point where they become transnational, strategic threats. Finally, efforts must continue to identify grassroots jihadists before they can launch attacks against soft targets. But these same imperatives also were valid last week; nothing has really changed at the tactical level.
Where the big change may be happening is at the political level. That bin Laden was located in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province (formerly known as the North-West Frontier Province) did not come as a surprise — STRATFOR has discussed this likelihood since 2005. We have also discussed the distrust and suspicion between the U.S. and Pakistan — which was clearly evidenced by the unilateral U.S. action in this case. The significant thing to watch for is the reaction of the Pakistani government and public to the raid. In the past, the Pakistani government has found creative ways of displaying its displeasure with the actions of the U.S. government — like manipulating the Pakistani public into the November 1979 sacking and destruction of the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad. While the average Pakistani may not care too much about bin Laden, public sentiment is running very high against U.S. operations in Pakistan, and this operation could serve to inflame such sentiments. These two elements mean that the coming weeks could be a very tense time for U.S. diplomatic and commercial interests in that country
STRATFOR BOOK
The Devolution of Jihadism: From Al Qaeda to Wider Movement
By Scott Stewart
U.S. President Barack Obama appeared in a hastily arranged televised address the night of May 1, 2011, to inform the world that U.S. counterterrorism forces had located and killed Osama bin Laden. The operation, which reportedly happened in the early hours of May 2 local time, targeted a compound in Abbottabad, a city located some 31 miles north of Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital. The nighttime raid resulted in a brief firefight that left bin Laden and several others dead. A U.S. helicopter reportedly was damaged in the raid and later destroyed by U.S. forces. Obama reported that no U.S. personnel were lost in the operation. After a brief search of the compound, the U.S. forces left with bin Laden’s body and presumably anything else that appeared to have intelligence value. From Obama’s carefully scripted speech, it would appear that the U.S. conducted the operation unilaterally with no Pakistani assistance — or even knowledge.
As evidenced by the spontaneous celebrations that erupted in Washington, New York and across the United States, the killing of bin Laden has struck a chord with many Americans. This was true not only of those who lost family members as a result of the attack, but of those who were vicariously terrorized and still vividly recall the deep sense of fear they felt the morning of Sept. 11, 2001, as they watched aircraft strike the World Trade Center Towers and saw those towers collapse on live television, and then heard reports of the Pentagon being struck by a third aircraft and of a fourth aircraft prevented from being used in another attack when it crashed in rural Pennsylvania. As that fear turned to anger, a deep-seated thirst for vengeance led the United States to invade Afghanistan in October 2001 and to declare a “global war on terrorism.”
Because of this sense of fulfilled vengeance, the death of bin Laden will certainly be one of those events that people will remember, like the 9/11 attacks themselves. In spite of the sense of justice and closure the killing of bin Laden brings, however, his death will likely have very little practical impact on the jihadist movement. More important will be the reaction of the Pakistani government to the operation and the impact it has on U.S.-Pakistani relations.
Foundations
To understand the impact of bin Laden’s death on the global jihadist movement, we must first remember that the phenomenon of jihadism is far wider than just the al Qaeda core leadership of bin Laden and his closest followers. Rather than a monolithic entity based on the al Qaeda group, jihadism has devolved into a far more diffuse network composed of many different parts. These parts include the core al Qaeda group formerly headed by bin Laden; a network of various regional franchise groups such as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); and last, a broad array of grassroots operatives who are adherents to the jihadist ideology but who are not formally affiliated with the al Qaeda core or one of the regional franchises.
The al Qaeda core always has been a fairly small and elite vanguard. Since 9/11, intense pressure has been placed upon this core organization by the U.S. government and its allies. This pressure has resulted in the death or capture of many al Qaeda cadres and has served to keep the group small due to overriding operational security concerns. This insular group has laid low in Pakistan, and this isolation has significantly degraded its ability to conduct attacks. All of this has caused the al Qaeda core to become primarily an organization that produces propaganda and provides guidance and inspiration to the other jihadist elements rather than an organization focused on conducting operations. While bin Laden and the al Qaeda core have received a great deal of media attention, the core group comprises only a very small portion of the larger jihadist movement.
As STRATFOR has analyzed the war between the jihadist movement and the rest of the world, we have come to view the battlefield as being divided into two distinct parts, the physical battlefield and the ideological battlefield. The post-9/11 assault on the al Qaeda core group hindered its ability to act upon the physical battlefield. For the past several years, they have been limited to fighting on the ideological battlefield, waging a war of propaganda and attempting to promote the ideology of jihadism in an effort to radicalize Muslims and prompt them to act. The danger has always existed that if pressure were taken off this core, it could regroup and return to the physical struggle. But the pressure has been relentless and the group has been unable to return to its pre-9/11 level of operational capability. This has resulted in the grassroots and franchise groups like AQAP taking the lead on the physical battlefield.
As we noted in our annual forecast of the jihadist movement, the al Qaeda core group not only has been eclipsed on the physical battlefield, over the past few years it has been overshadowed on the ideological battlefield as well. Groups such as AQAP have begun setting the tone on the ideological realm — as in its call for Muslims to assume the leaderless resistance model rather than traveling to join groups — and we have seen the al Qaeda core follow the lead of AQAP rather than set the tone themselves. We believe this deference to AQAP is a sign of the al Qaeda core’s weakness, and of its struggle to remain relevant on the ideological battlefield. There also have been many disagreements among various actors in the jihadist movement over doctrinal issues such as targeting foreigners over local security forces and attacks that kill Muslims.
The Emir is Dead, Long Live the Emir
While the al Qaeda core has been marginalized recently, it has practiced good operational security and has been able to protect its apex leadership for nearly 10 years from one of the most intense manhunts in human history. It clearly foresaw the possibility that one of its apex leaders could be taken out and planned accordingly. This means keeping bin Laden and his deputy, Egyptian physician Ayman al-Zawahiri, in different locations and having a succession plan. There is also very little question that al-Zawahiri is firmly in command of the core group. Even prior to bin Laden’s death, many analysts considered al-Zawahiri to be the man in charge of most of the operational aspects of the al Qaeda group — the “chief executive officer,” with bin Laden being more of a figurehead or “chairman of the board.” That said, the intelligence collected during the operation against bin Laden could provide leads to track down other leaders, and this may make them nervous in spite of their efforts to practice good operational security.
Certainly, bin Laden was an important person who was able to raise much funding and who became an international icon following 9/11; because of this, it will be hard to replace him. At the same time, the jihadist movement has weathered the loss of a number of influential individuals, from the assassination of Abdullah Azzam to the arrests of the Blind Sheikh and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Yet in spite of these losses, the ideology has continued, new members have been recruited and new leaders have stepped up to fill the void. Ideologies are far harder to kill than individuals, especially ideologies that encourage their followers to embrace martyrdom whether their leaders are dead or alive. This means that we do not believe the death of bin Laden will result in the death of the global jihadist movement: A man is dead but the ideology lives on.
The Threat
The survival of the ideology of jihadism means the threat of terrorist attacks remains. The good news is that as one moves down the jihadist pyramid from the al Qaeda core to the regional franchises to the grassroots, the level of terrorist tradecraft these individuals possess diminishes and the threat they pose is not as severe. Certainly, grassroots terrorists can and will continue to kill people, but they lack the ability to conduct dramatic, strategic attacks. Thus, though the threat becomes more widespread and harder to guard against, at the same time it becomes less severe.
There obviously will be some concerns regarding some sort of major attack in retribution for bin Laden’s death. Indeed, jihadists have long threatened to conduct attacks over the arrests and deaths of key figures. Analytically, however, the idea that al Qaeda or one of its regional franchise groups has some sort of superattack on standby for activation upon bin Laden’s death is simply not logical. First, the al Qaeda core group has attempted to conduct many attacks against the U.S. homeland following 9/11, as have franchise groups like AQAP. While these plots did not succeed, it was not for lack of trying. Jihadists have also made many empty threats regarding a follow-on to the 9/11 attacks — only to be embarrassed by their inability to follow through. Third, so many plots have been thwarted over the past decade that if the core al Qaeda group or a franchise group had a plan primed and ready to go, it would not sit on it and run the risk of its being discovered and compromised. Instead, it would execute such an attack as soon as it was ready. Furthermore, jihadists — especially those at the grassroots and regional franchise levels — have not demonstrated the sophisticated apparatus required to conduct off-the-shelf planning exhibited by groups like Hezbollah. They generally tend to work on attack plans from scratch and execute those plans when ready.
Undoubtedly, there were jihadists planning attacks on the United States before the death of bin Laden, and there are jihadists planning attacks today. However, these individuals probably would have carried out this planning and any eventual attack — if possible — regardless of bin Laden’s fate. Will groups conducting future attacks claim they were acting in retribution for bin Laden? Probably. Would they have attempted such an attack if he were still alive? Probably.
The potential for low-level impulsive retribution attacks by unprepared individuals or groups directed at American or other Western targets does exist, however. This type of impromptu attack would be more likely a shooting rather than an attack using an explosive device, so there is good reason for the U.S. government to increase security measures around the globe.
The result of all this is that the threat from the global jihadist movement will continue in the short term with no real change. This means that pressure needs to be maintained on the al Qaeda core so it will not have the chance to recover, retool and return to attacking the United States. Pressure also needs to be maintained on the jihadist franchise groups so they cannot mature operationally to the point where they become transnational, strategic threats. Finally, efforts must continue to identify grassroots jihadists before they can launch attacks against soft targets. But these same imperatives also were valid last week; nothing has really changed at the tactical level.
Where the big change may be happening is at the political level. That bin Laden was located in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province (formerly known as the North-West Frontier Province) did not come as a surprise — STRATFOR has discussed this likelihood since 2005. We have also discussed the distrust and suspicion between the U.S. and Pakistan — which was clearly evidenced by the unilateral U.S. action in this case. The significant thing to watch for is the reaction of the Pakistani government and public to the raid. In the past, the Pakistani government has found creative ways of displaying its displeasure with the actions of the U.S. government — like manipulating the Pakistani public into the November 1979 sacking and destruction of the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad. While the average Pakistani may not care too much about bin Laden, public sentiment is running very high against U.S. operations in Pakistan, and this operation could serve to inflame such sentiments. These two elements mean that the coming weeks could be a very tense time for U.S. diplomatic and commercial interests in that country
The Devolution of Jihadism: From Al Qaeda to Wider Movement
By Scott Stewart
U.S. President Barack Obama appeared in a hastily arranged televised address the night of May 1, 2011, to inform the world that U.S. counterterrorism forces had located and killed Osama bin Laden. The operation, which reportedly happened in the early hours of May 2 local time, targeted a compound in Abbottabad, a city located some 31 miles north of Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital. The nighttime raid resulted in a brief firefight that left bin Laden and several others dead. A U.S. helicopter reportedly was damaged in the raid and later destroyed by U.S. forces. Obama reported that no U.S. personnel were lost in the operation. After a brief search of the compound, the U.S. forces left with bin Laden’s body and presumably anything else that appeared to have intelligence value. From Obama’s carefully scripted speech, it would appear that the U.S. conducted the operation unilaterally with no Pakistani assistance — or even knowledge.
As evidenced by the spontaneous celebrations that erupted in Washington, New York and across the United States, the killing of bin Laden has struck a chord with many Americans. This was true not only of those who lost family members as a result of the attack, but of those who were vicariously terrorized and still vividly recall the deep sense of fear they felt the morning of Sept. 11, 2001, as they watched aircraft strike the World Trade Center Towers and saw those towers collapse on live television, and then heard reports of the Pentagon being struck by a third aircraft and of a fourth aircraft prevented from being used in another attack when it crashed in rural Pennsylvania. As that fear turned to anger, a deep-seated thirst for vengeance led the United States to invade Afghanistan in October 2001 and to declare a “global war on terrorism.”
Because of this sense of fulfilled vengeance, the death of bin Laden will certainly be one of those events that people will remember, like the 9/11 attacks themselves. In spite of the sense of justice and closure the killing of bin Laden brings, however, his death will likely have very little practical impact on the jihadist movement. More important will be the reaction of the Pakistani government to the operation and the impact it has on U.S.-Pakistani relations.
Foundations
To understand the impact of bin Laden’s death on the global jihadist movement, we must first remember that the phenomenon of jihadism is far wider than just the al Qaeda core leadership of bin Laden and his closest followers. Rather than a monolithic entity based on the al Qaeda group, jihadism has devolved into a far more diffuse network composed of many different parts. These parts include the core al Qaeda group formerly headed by bin Laden; a network of various regional franchise groups such as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); and last, a broad array of grassroots operatives who are adherents to the jihadist ideology but who are not formally affiliated with the al Qaeda core or one of the regional franchises.
The al Qaeda core always has been a fairly small and elite vanguard. Since 9/11, intense pressure has been placed upon this core organization by the U.S. government and its allies. This pressure has resulted in the death or capture of many al Qaeda cadres and has served to keep the group small due to overriding operational security concerns. This insular group has laid low in Pakistan, and this isolation has significantly degraded its ability to conduct attacks. All of this has caused the al Qaeda core to become primarily an organization that produces propaganda and provides guidance and inspiration to the other jihadist elements rather than an organization focused on conducting operations. While bin Laden and the al Qaeda core have received a great deal of media attention, the core group comprises only a very small portion of the larger jihadist movement.
As STRATFOR has analyzed the war between the jihadist movement and the rest of the world, we have come to view the battlefield as being divided into two distinct parts, the physical battlefield and the ideological battlefield. The post-9/11 assault on the al Qaeda core group hindered its ability to act upon the physical battlefield. For the past several years, they have been limited to fighting on the ideological battlefield, waging a war of propaganda and attempting to promote the ideology of jihadism in an effort to radicalize Muslims and prompt them to act. The danger has always existed that if pressure were taken off this core, it could regroup and return to the physical struggle. But the pressure has been relentless and the group has been unable to return to its pre-9/11 level of operational capability. This has resulted in the grassroots and franchise groups like AQAP taking the lead on the physical battlefield.
As we noted in our annual forecast of the jihadist movement, the al Qaeda core group not only has been eclipsed on the physical battlefield, over the past few years it has been overshadowed on the ideological battlefield as well. Groups such as AQAP have begun setting the tone on the ideological realm — as in its call for Muslims to assume the leaderless resistance model rather than traveling to join groups — and we have seen the al Qaeda core follow the lead of AQAP rather than set the tone themselves. We believe this deference to AQAP is a sign of the al Qaeda core’s weakness, and of its struggle to remain relevant on the ideological battlefield. There also have been many disagreements among various actors in the jihadist movement over doctrinal issues such as targeting foreigners over local security forces and attacks that kill Muslims.
The Emir is Dead, Long Live the Emir
While the al Qaeda core has been marginalized recently, it has practiced good operational security and has been able to protect its apex leadership for nearly 10 years from one of the most intense manhunts in human history. It clearly foresaw the possibility that one of its apex leaders could be taken out and planned accordingly. This means keeping bin Laden and his deputy, Egyptian physician Ayman al-Zawahiri, in different locations and having a succession plan. There is also very little question that al-Zawahiri is firmly in command of the core group. Even prior to bin Laden’s death, many analysts considered al-Zawahiri to be the man in charge of most of the operational aspects of the al Qaeda group — the “chief executive officer,” with bin Laden being more of a figurehead or “chairman of the board.” That said, the intelligence collected during the operation against bin Laden could provide leads to track down other leaders, and this may make them nervous in spite of their efforts to practice good operational security.
Certainly, bin Laden was an important person who was able to raise much funding and who became an international icon following 9/11; because of this, it will be hard to replace him. At the same time, the jihadist movement has weathered the loss of a number of influential individuals, from the assassination of Abdullah Azzam to the arrests of the Blind Sheikh and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Yet in spite of these losses, the ideology has continued, new members have been recruited and new leaders have stepped up to fill the void. Ideologies are far harder to kill than individuals, especially ideologies that encourage their followers to embrace martyrdom whether their leaders are dead or alive. This means that we do not believe the death of bin Laden will result in the death of the global jihadist movement: A man is dead but the ideology lives on.
The Threat
The survival of the ideology of jihadism means the threat of terrorist attacks remains. The good news is that as one moves down the jihadist pyramid from the al Qaeda core to the regional franchises to the grassroots, the level of terrorist tradecraft these individuals possess diminishes and the threat they pose is not as severe. Certainly, grassroots terrorists can and will continue to kill people, but they lack the ability to conduct dramatic, strategic attacks. Thus, though the threat becomes more widespread and harder to guard against, at the same time it becomes less severe.
There obviously will be some concerns regarding some sort of major attack in retribution for bin Laden’s death. Indeed, jihadists have long threatened to conduct attacks over the arrests and deaths of key figures. Analytically, however, the idea that al Qaeda or one of its regional franchise groups has some sort of superattack on standby for activation upon bin Laden’s death is simply not logical. First, the al Qaeda core group has attempted to conduct many attacks against the U.S. homeland following 9/11, as have franchise groups like AQAP. While these plots did not succeed, it was not for lack of trying. Jihadists have also made many empty threats regarding a follow-on to the 9/11 attacks — only to be embarrassed by their inability to follow through. Third, so many plots have been thwarted over the past decade that if the core al Qaeda group or a franchise group had a plan primed and ready to go, it would not sit on it and run the risk of its being discovered and compromised. Instead, it would execute such an attack as soon as it was ready. Furthermore, jihadists — especially those at the grassroots and regional franchise levels — have not demonstrated the sophisticated apparatus required to conduct off-the-shelf planning exhibited by groups like Hezbollah. They generally tend to work on attack plans from scratch and execute those plans when ready.
Undoubtedly, there were jihadists planning attacks on the United States before the death of bin Laden, and there are jihadists planning attacks today. However, these individuals probably would have carried out this planning and any eventual attack — if possible — regardless of bin Laden’s fate. Will groups conducting future attacks claim they were acting in retribution for bin Laden? Probably. Would they have attempted such an attack if he were still alive? Probably.
The potential for low-level impulsive retribution attacks by unprepared individuals or groups directed at American or other Western targets does exist, however. This type of impromptu attack would be more likely a shooting rather than an attack using an explosive device, so there is good reason for the U.S. government to increase security measures around the globe.
The result of all this is that the threat from the global jihadist movement will continue in the short term with no real change. This means that pressure needs to be maintained on the al Qaeda core so it will not have the chance to recover, retool and return to attacking the United States. Pressure also needs to be maintained on the jihadist franchise groups so they cannot mature operationally to the point where they become transnational, strategic threats. Finally, efforts must continue to identify grassroots jihadists before they can launch attacks against soft targets. But these same imperatives also were valid last week; nothing has really changed at the tactical level.
Where the big change may be happening is at the political level. That bin Laden was located in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province (formerly known as the North-West Frontier Province) did not come as a surprise — STRATFOR has discussed this likelihood since 2005. We have also discussed the distrust and suspicion between the U.S. and Pakistan — which was clearly evidenced by the unilateral U.S. action in this case. The significant thing to watch for is the reaction of the Pakistani government and public to the raid. In the past, the Pakistani government has found creative ways of displaying its displeasure with the actions of the U.S. government — like manipulating the Pakistani public into the November 1979 sacking and destruction of the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad. While the average Pakistani may not care too much about bin Laden, public sentiment is running very high against U.S. operations in Pakistan, and this operation could serve to inflame such sentiments. These two elements mean that the coming weeks could be a very tense time for U.S. diplomatic and commercial interests in that country
Keeping Pakistan From Falling Apart
STEPHEN P. COHEN | 03 MAY 2011
FEATURE - Original document was copied from WPR
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The pro-democracy uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East have moved crisis-ridden Pakistan out of the global spotlight. This is unfortunate, because Pakistan's timid democratic resurgence faces a variety of obstacles, and its stability is more uncertain than ever before. To expect that Pakistan may soon experience a similar democratic transformation is not only excessively optimistic, but also ignores recent history: Pakistan exhausted its own "Arab Street" moment in 2007, when Gen. Pervez Musharraf was forced to resign following demonstrations by a diverse and vibrant civil society movement led by Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry.
That was the last time Pakistani liberals were seen on the streets. Since then, public spaces and opinion have fallen into the hands of extremists. In December 2007, months after she returned from exile, former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was assassinated while campaigning for the country's first democratic elections following almost a decade of military rule. Her victory had seemed certain and would have given the country an experienced and charismatic leader. The more recent assassinations of Salman Taseer, the governor of Punjab province, and Shahbaz Bhatti, the federal minister for minorities, both targeted for opposing the adoption of a new blasphemy law, highlight how extremists have succeeded in influencing and constraining the political agenda in Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi, but also in Rawalpindi, the army's headquarters.
Pakistan's liberal intelligentsia is hostage to two undemocratic forces that have steadily risen to power. On the one hand, moderates face the wrath of conservative Islamists and their radical fringe supporters, who condemn the government for its permissive stance on the deadly U.S. drone strikes on the Afghan borderlands. These groups have expanded their popular support in the aftermath of the crisis centered on Raymond Davis, a CIA contractor detained by Pakistani authorities for almost two months on charges of killing two civilians last January in Lahore.
On the other hand, Pakistani moderates remain constrained by the authoritarian impulses of the military, which has formally handed over power to President Asif Ali Zardari and his civilian administration but continues to effectively control the country's destiny, from its economy to its foreign policy. Remaining opposition voices, like that of journalist and former Information Minister Sherry Rehman, now operate in an environment of fear, their lives constantly under threat by extremists.
The moderates' withdrawal from the public square is perhaps the most disquieting development in Pakistan in recent times, setting it fundamentally apart from the positive developments in the Arab world, if not quite on the opposite extreme to them. Liberal democratic Pakistanis are now on the defensive, with troubling implications for a country already facing a variety of challenges, from a crumbling state and governance structure to an immense demographic transition.
Too Important to Fail
The current scenario is worrisome, but the future could be even worse. Over the next five years, Pakistan's success as a stable state, measured along any dimension, is far from guaranteed, and in fact, the "normalization" of Pakistan remains doubtful. The most probable scenario is one of Pakistan "muddling through" rapidly deteriorating domestic socio-economic, political and regional security challenges.
But unlike with other failed or failing states, the United States cannot afford to just ignore Pakistan or let it fail comprehensively. There are four reasons why radical disengagement is at odds with American interests in the region.
First, on the immediate horizon, there is Afghanistan. The success of American plans to withdraw U.S. troops following 2014 and to ensure security for a non-Taliban regime in Kabul until then depends not only on Pakistan's willingness to assist in this mission, but also on its military and political capacity to do so. A secure Afghanistan requires a stable and preferably moderate regime in Pakistan. In truth, the problem is less one of a "trust deficit" than of a verification deficit, with both sides suspicious of the motives and actions of the other in Afghanistan and along the Afghanistan-Pakistan borderlands.
Second, some of Pakistan's peripheral regions have become a safe haven for a variety of extremist and terrorist organizations that have expanded their area of operations far beyond Pakistan and South Asia. The most glaring case is that of the Lashkar-e-Taiba, whose emerging international profile and links to al-Qaida have led it to target Mumbai in 2008 and possibly to attempt an attack on New York's Times Square in 2010. A failed Pakistan would only increase these actors' capacity to operate internationally.
Third, Pakistan is just "too nuclear" to fail. Its nuclear weapons program remains out of the purview of the nonproliferation regime, and while the risks of its stockpile falling into the hands of terrorists are often exaggerated, it has a horrible track record in terms of horizontal proliferation to rogue states (.pdf), including Iran, North Korea and Libya. The same applies to its persistent conflict with India: A nuclear holocaust in South Asia is an improbable outcome, but the two countries have fought four wars, and a collapsed Pakistani state would create immense political chaos on the subcontinent.
Finally, Pakistan is not Somalia: It is just too big and too central to be allowed to fail and plunge into anarchy. The United States cannot afford to ignore Pakistan, due to its immense size, with the world's second-largest Muslim population, and its vital geopolitical location between China, India, Iran and Afghanistan. Pakistan may not possess any significant natural resources, but it is at the heart of several strategic energy and transportation corridors between South and Central Asia and the Middle East. Beijing, for example, immensely prizes the access Pakistan offers to the Indian Ocean, which promises to be a major strategic theater for both Asia and the emerging global order in the 21st century.
Four Major Challenges
If letting Pakistan fail is not an option, what needs to be done? What challenges does the country face, and how can we expect its future to look in five to seven years? These were the main questions addressed in a recent project I coordinated at the Brookings Institution with a group of 14 American, European, Pakistani and Indian experts. The group identified a set of 19 crucial factors, distributed among four clusters.
The first cluster includes domestic concerns regarding Pakistan's demographics, education and economy. The idea of the Pakistani middle class as a bastion of democracy is a dangerous myth, given that historically middle classes have at times supported fascist and totalitarian movements. In Pakistan, in particular, anti-Americanism is on the rise, feeding anti-democratic tendencies among the educated urban population and the military.
At the same time, Pakistan faces the unsettling impact of a tremendous population boom paralleled by rapid urbanization and a weak education system. Half of the 180 million Pakistanis are now under 20 years of age. Meanwhile, the population has tripled since 1960 and is likely to grow by another 85 million in the next 20 years.
The collapsing economy further complicates the picture. GDP growth slowed to an abysmal 1.6 percent during the recession of 2008 and is estimated to reach a mere 2.6 percent in 2011. Inflation has skyrocketed, surpassing 20 percent in 2008 and projected to remain above 10 percent for another few years. Unemployment has now reached a 20-year high of 14 percent, and is expected to increase until 2013. With the bureaucracy and other state structures largely incapacitated and unable to respond to these massive demographic and economic challenges, the country's effective governance and ultimate viability now depend on a combination of massive foreign assistance and the remittances of overseas Pakistanis, which together totaled $13 billion in 2010.
A second cluster of factors shaping Pakistan's future revolves around the collective identity of its citizens, who identify with and act on the basis of their regional, ethnic and religious identities. The idea of a secular, moderate and democratic Pakistan as promoted by Pakistan's founding statesman, Muhammed Ali Jinnah, is under increasing attack from regionalist and ethno-linguistic groups, as well as from radical Islamists and other sectarian extremists. Unless the government undertakes a radical transformation to support the idea of a liberal Pakistan by word and deed, we will see a continued erosion of the moral authority of the state and an increasingly fractious debate over the existential purpose of Pakistan.
While unlikely to endanger the stability of the state, ethno-linguistic movements and other centrifugal forces -- especially in Balochistan, Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa -- have been on the rise and could contribute to undermining the legitimacy of the government and the army. Somewhat more likely is the possibility of a revival of Pashtun nationalism -- not from the left, in the tradition of the secular Awami National Party, but from the right, using the rhetoric and organization of the Pakistani Taliban. In the end, it is not Islam or religion per se that is the problem, but the way in which religion is exploited by various political actors, including, at times, the moderate political parties and the military. The genie of ethno-sectarian radicalism has now escaped from the bottle, and much of Pakistan's future will be determined by the efforts and degree of success achieved in containing these groups and their rapidly expanding popular support bases.
The third cluster of factors shaping Pakistan's future concerns "state coherence," meaning the ability of Pakistanis to work for a common goal -- or against a common enemy -- and the ways in which various actors and institutions facilitate or oppose this. The capacity of the Pakistani state to ensure even the most basic governance has eroded, and it has yet to regain the integrity and effectiveness it had 40 or 50 years ago, even though it is now called on to do much more. This is aggravated by the army's attempts to carry out functions ordinarily executed by civilians, thus negatively affecting the state's legitimacy and capacity to tax, educate or maintain law and order. The military's behavior appears to have changed since 2007, allowing Zardari some room for maneuver. But it is important to recall that the army did not withdraw to the barracks because of a shift in its core praetorian ethos, which remains fundamentally committed to a tutelary and interventionist role.
The consequences are disastrous for future stability and governance, translating into a chronic incapacity to integrate security, political, economic and administrative requirements in a central and long-term decision-making process. The state's weakness is reflected in Pakistan's low ranking on almost every governance indicator -- crime, corruption and tax evasion, for instance -- as well as by its presence in the Failed State Index, where it just entered the Top 10 and acquired "critical" status.
Basic reform has to reduce the military's disproportionate and increasingly influential role in governance, and that may be very hard to achieve. Even if civilian competence is allowed to grow, it will take years, if not decades, and will require a long period of peace before it is up to the task. The media, judiciary and political parties all have an important role to play, but also suffer from their own internal weaknesses. They are thus, by themselves, incapable of reversing the political pattern of alternation between weak, unstable democratic governments and a benign authoritarianism, usually led by the army. This is likely to continue to erode Pakistan's governance over the next five years.
A final cluster looks at Pakistan's international environment. While Pakistanis may have an exaggerated view of the pernicious role played by outsiders, four external actors and two trends do shape Pakistan to a worrisome degree.
First, of the many factors complicating any forecasts of Pakistan's future, Afghanistan is certainly near the top. It affects relations with the United States and has a potential influence on Pakistan's Pashtun population. A Taliban victory there would be regarded by Pakistan's domestic Islamic extremists as a civilizational victory. For its part, the Pakistani military will also resist giving up its immense ambitions in Afghanistan, including significant influence -- if not control -- over Kabul in order to achieve its longstanding desire to balance India there.
Second, with regard to Washington, relations with the United States have deteriorated drastically, as has the image of the U.S. in Pakistan. What is euphemistically called a "trust deficit" will continue to constrain another euphemism: the U.S.-Pakistan "partnership." Conspiracy theories about U.S. collusion with India and Israel to weaken Pakistan and seize its nuclear weapons are widely shared even at the highest echelons of the army. A recent poll found that, when asked to name Pakistan's major enemy, 59 percent of Pakistanischose the U.S., ahead of other perceived threats, including India (52 percent), the Taliban (34 percent) and al-Qaida (21 percent).
Third, China has established itself as the most influential player in Islamabad. Its popularity among elites and in most of the provinces, its economic penetration, and its comprehensive support for the security establishment in the form of military hardware and nuclear technology have translated into an ever-increasing leverage over Islamabad. This was most recently symbolized by the visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to Islamabad in December 2010.
Finally, Pakistani paranoia regarding India is likely to persist. The management of Pakistan's relations with India has proved to be a source of conflict between the country's civilian and military leaderships and has historically been a leading driver of regime change, with the army often regarding civilian leaders as being too soft toward India. Pakistan's ethnic cohesion is also strained by differences among its various provinces in the priority they accord to Kashmir and other conflicts with India, with Punjab normally being the most hawkish. Pakistan would probably be better off seeking a long-term accommodation with India today, before it grows weaker and India stronger. But some in Pakistan still believe that the use of terrorism, carried out under the umbrella of a threat of nuclear escalation, will keep India off balance.
Two additional external trends will influence Pakistan's future: globalization and Islamabad's growing nuclear arsenal, which seems unconstrained by financial shortfall or strategic logic. The two are intertwined. Pakistan received almost all of its nuclear technology from other countries and took advantage of globalization to create purchasing networks that stretched around the world. It subsequently used these networks to share its nuclear technology with several customers. Pakistan's increasingly international profile indicates that more such incoming and outgoing flows of people, knowledge and technologies are to be expected, and not all of them will have benign intentions.
Pakistan in 2017: Six Scenarios
Given these four clusters, what can we expect for Pakistan on a five- to seven-year horizon? The study identifies a total of six scenarios, two of them being more likely and four others less probable.
The most likely scenario is "more of the same": an establishment-dominated Pakistan muddling through the various challenges and threats described above, with limited and erratic support from the outside. The military might take over, but only temporarily to effect short-term fixes. It will neither encourage nor tolerate deep reform, however, and civilians will be content with a limited political role. While seemingly sustainable in the short term, this effective surrendering to the volatilities of contingency could, in the long run, lead to a visible decline of Pakistan's integrity as a state.
The second likely scenario is that of "parallel Pakistans," in which the state would carry on as a recognizable central government, but some of the provinces and regions would succumb to centrifugal forces -- not in the form of a formal breakup, but on three latent dimensions: local political regime type; specific governance, economy and education models; and policies toward Islamist and separatist forces. De jure, Pakistan would live on, but de facto we would witness the emergence of political structures that contest, clash and overlap with the sovereignty of the federal center.
The four less likely scenarios include "democratic consolidation" based on an agreement between the two dominant parties, with the army accepting a permanently recessed role; "breakaway and fragmentation" after the disintegration of the army, either through a war or ethnic and sectarian differences; "civil or military authoritarianism" based on a centralized modernizing agenda or charismatic leader; and an "army-led revolution," along the lines of the Turkish or Indonesian experiences.
Overall, the interplay between the contested fields within Pakistan and the integrity of the Pakistani state will be determinative. It will be possible to measure this tension by Islamabad's future willingness and capacity to correct course and reverse trends along six crucial dimensions: dealing quickly with economic issues; rebuilding state institutions; creating effective and coherent governance at the top; breaking the cycle of the "begging bowl" dependency; avoiding new crises with India; and resisting the temptation to further appease Islamists.
A Diverse Menu of Policy Options
The fact that increasingly radical policy suggestions for Pakistan are getting more attention and leverage in Washington is a worrisome indication of how close the United States is to giving up on the country. Two suggestions stand out: Ambassador Robert Blackwill's "plan B," calling for a de facto partition of Afghanistan, which would necessarily lead to a greater Pashtunistan with territories carved out on the Pakistani side of the border and Ralph Peters' provocative map that redesigns the political borders of the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, reducing Pakistan to a rump of Punjab and parts of Sindh. Others talk of a strike against Pakistan should another terror attack be launched from its territory on the United States.
Instead of thinking along these lines, the United States should explore alternative scenarios and design a long-term Pakistan policy that is more than a mere derivation of Washington's immediate priorities in Afghanistan. For all the reasons and scenarios developed above, Pakistan cannot just be wished away: If nothing is done now, it will probably re-emerge as an even bigger problem and a more troubled country in the future.
The Western powers, Japan and India therefore need to develop a concerted strategy that will strengthen reform-minded and democratic forces in Pakistan, encourage the military to remain in a recessed role, help improve the Pakistani economy and generate more resources to address vital domestic needs.
This does not mean that the United States must involve itself in running the country or that it should get entangled in negotiations between Pakistan's military and political actors, which would be both costly and risky. There are good intermediate options, such as Thomas Friedman's proposal to disengage from South Asia and focus on offshore balancingbased on punctual "corrective" interventions. Other options worth exploring on the policy menu include encouraging India to supplant Pakistan in Afghanistan; containing Pakistan regionally; facilitating an India-Pakistan settlement on Kashmir; or just continuing the current cluster of policies. A failed or fragmented Pakistan, though, is not an option and should be kept off the menu as long as possible.
It is hard to be optimistic that the West and the United States will get both Afghanistan and Pakistan "right," that India will suddenly pursue a conciliatory policy with regard to its neighbor or that the Pakistani elite -- especially the military -- will have both the intent and capacity to undertake a program of deep reforms. That leaves the current, and perhaps the least worst, cluster of policies. When it comes to Pakistan, we must hope for the best, but that should not keep us from at least thinking about the worst.
STEPHEN P. COHEN | 03 MAY 2011
FEATURE - Original document was copied from WPR
Login to Discuss Email | Print | Share | Reprint
The pro-democracy uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East have moved crisis-ridden Pakistan out of the global spotlight. This is unfortunate, because Pakistan's timid democratic resurgence faces a variety of obstacles, and its stability is more uncertain than ever before. To expect that Pakistan may soon experience a similar democratic transformation is not only excessively optimistic, but also ignores recent history: Pakistan exhausted its own "Arab Street" moment in 2007, when Gen. Pervez Musharraf was forced to resign following demonstrations by a diverse and vibrant civil society movement led by Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry.
That was the last time Pakistani liberals were seen on the streets. Since then, public spaces and opinion have fallen into the hands of extremists. In December 2007, months after she returned from exile, former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was assassinated while campaigning for the country's first democratic elections following almost a decade of military rule. Her victory had seemed certain and would have given the country an experienced and charismatic leader. The more recent assassinations of Salman Taseer, the governor of Punjab province, and Shahbaz Bhatti, the federal minister for minorities, both targeted for opposing the adoption of a new blasphemy law, highlight how extremists have succeeded in influencing and constraining the political agenda in Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi, but also in Rawalpindi, the army's headquarters.
Pakistan's liberal intelligentsia is hostage to two undemocratic forces that have steadily risen to power. On the one hand, moderates face the wrath of conservative Islamists and their radical fringe supporters, who condemn the government for its permissive stance on the deadly U.S. drone strikes on the Afghan borderlands. These groups have expanded their popular support in the aftermath of the crisis centered on Raymond Davis, a CIA contractor detained by Pakistani authorities for almost two months on charges of killing two civilians last January in Lahore.
On the other hand, Pakistani moderates remain constrained by the authoritarian impulses of the military, which has formally handed over power to President Asif Ali Zardari and his civilian administration but continues to effectively control the country's destiny, from its economy to its foreign policy. Remaining opposition voices, like that of journalist and former Information Minister Sherry Rehman, now operate in an environment of fear, their lives constantly under threat by extremists.
The moderates' withdrawal from the public square is perhaps the most disquieting development in Pakistan in recent times, setting it fundamentally apart from the positive developments in the Arab world, if not quite on the opposite extreme to them. Liberal democratic Pakistanis are now on the defensive, with troubling implications for a country already facing a variety of challenges, from a crumbling state and governance structure to an immense demographic transition.
Too Important to Fail
The current scenario is worrisome, but the future could be even worse. Over the next five years, Pakistan's success as a stable state, measured along any dimension, is far from guaranteed, and in fact, the "normalization" of Pakistan remains doubtful. The most probable scenario is one of Pakistan "muddling through" rapidly deteriorating domestic socio-economic, political and regional security challenges.
But unlike with other failed or failing states, the United States cannot afford to just ignore Pakistan or let it fail comprehensively. There are four reasons why radical disengagement is at odds with American interests in the region.
First, on the immediate horizon, there is Afghanistan. The success of American plans to withdraw U.S. troops following 2014 and to ensure security for a non-Taliban regime in Kabul until then depends not only on Pakistan's willingness to assist in this mission, but also on its military and political capacity to do so. A secure Afghanistan requires a stable and preferably moderate regime in Pakistan. In truth, the problem is less one of a "trust deficit" than of a verification deficit, with both sides suspicious of the motives and actions of the other in Afghanistan and along the Afghanistan-Pakistan borderlands.
Second, some of Pakistan's peripheral regions have become a safe haven for a variety of extremist and terrorist organizations that have expanded their area of operations far beyond Pakistan and South Asia. The most glaring case is that of the Lashkar-e-Taiba, whose emerging international profile and links to al-Qaida have led it to target Mumbai in 2008 and possibly to attempt an attack on New York's Times Square in 2010. A failed Pakistan would only increase these actors' capacity to operate internationally.
Third, Pakistan is just "too nuclear" to fail. Its nuclear weapons program remains out of the purview of the nonproliferation regime, and while the risks of its stockpile falling into the hands of terrorists are often exaggerated, it has a horrible track record in terms of horizontal proliferation to rogue states (.pdf), including Iran, North Korea and Libya. The same applies to its persistent conflict with India: A nuclear holocaust in South Asia is an improbable outcome, but the two countries have fought four wars, and a collapsed Pakistani state would create immense political chaos on the subcontinent.
Finally, Pakistan is not Somalia: It is just too big and too central to be allowed to fail and plunge into anarchy. The United States cannot afford to ignore Pakistan, due to its immense size, with the world's second-largest Muslim population, and its vital geopolitical location between China, India, Iran and Afghanistan. Pakistan may not possess any significant natural resources, but it is at the heart of several strategic energy and transportation corridors between South and Central Asia and the Middle East. Beijing, for example, immensely prizes the access Pakistan offers to the Indian Ocean, which promises to be a major strategic theater for both Asia and the emerging global order in the 21st century.
Four Major Challenges
If letting Pakistan fail is not an option, what needs to be done? What challenges does the country face, and how can we expect its future to look in five to seven years? These were the main questions addressed in a recent project I coordinated at the Brookings Institution with a group of 14 American, European, Pakistani and Indian experts. The group identified a set of 19 crucial factors, distributed among four clusters.
The first cluster includes domestic concerns regarding Pakistan's demographics, education and economy. The idea of the Pakistani middle class as a bastion of democracy is a dangerous myth, given that historically middle classes have at times supported fascist and totalitarian movements. In Pakistan, in particular, anti-Americanism is on the rise, feeding anti-democratic tendencies among the educated urban population and the military.
At the same time, Pakistan faces the unsettling impact of a tremendous population boom paralleled by rapid urbanization and a weak education system. Half of the 180 million Pakistanis are now under 20 years of age. Meanwhile, the population has tripled since 1960 and is likely to grow by another 85 million in the next 20 years.
The collapsing economy further complicates the picture. GDP growth slowed to an abysmal 1.6 percent during the recession of 2008 and is estimated to reach a mere 2.6 percent in 2011. Inflation has skyrocketed, surpassing 20 percent in 2008 and projected to remain above 10 percent for another few years. Unemployment has now reached a 20-year high of 14 percent, and is expected to increase until 2013. With the bureaucracy and other state structures largely incapacitated and unable to respond to these massive demographic and economic challenges, the country's effective governance and ultimate viability now depend on a combination of massive foreign assistance and the remittances of overseas Pakistanis, which together totaled $13 billion in 2010.
A second cluster of factors shaping Pakistan's future revolves around the collective identity of its citizens, who identify with and act on the basis of their regional, ethnic and religious identities. The idea of a secular, moderate and democratic Pakistan as promoted by Pakistan's founding statesman, Muhammed Ali Jinnah, is under increasing attack from regionalist and ethno-linguistic groups, as well as from radical Islamists and other sectarian extremists. Unless the government undertakes a radical transformation to support the idea of a liberal Pakistan by word and deed, we will see a continued erosion of the moral authority of the state and an increasingly fractious debate over the existential purpose of Pakistan.
While unlikely to endanger the stability of the state, ethno-linguistic movements and other centrifugal forces -- especially in Balochistan, Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa -- have been on the rise and could contribute to undermining the legitimacy of the government and the army. Somewhat more likely is the possibility of a revival of Pashtun nationalism -- not from the left, in the tradition of the secular Awami National Party, but from the right, using the rhetoric and organization of the Pakistani Taliban. In the end, it is not Islam or religion per se that is the problem, but the way in which religion is exploited by various political actors, including, at times, the moderate political parties and the military. The genie of ethno-sectarian radicalism has now escaped from the bottle, and much of Pakistan's future will be determined by the efforts and degree of success achieved in containing these groups and their rapidly expanding popular support bases.
The third cluster of factors shaping Pakistan's future concerns "state coherence," meaning the ability of Pakistanis to work for a common goal -- or against a common enemy -- and the ways in which various actors and institutions facilitate or oppose this. The capacity of the Pakistani state to ensure even the most basic governance has eroded, and it has yet to regain the integrity and effectiveness it had 40 or 50 years ago, even though it is now called on to do much more. This is aggravated by the army's attempts to carry out functions ordinarily executed by civilians, thus negatively affecting the state's legitimacy and capacity to tax, educate or maintain law and order. The military's behavior appears to have changed since 2007, allowing Zardari some room for maneuver. But it is important to recall that the army did not withdraw to the barracks because of a shift in its core praetorian ethos, which remains fundamentally committed to a tutelary and interventionist role.
The consequences are disastrous for future stability and governance, translating into a chronic incapacity to integrate security, political, economic and administrative requirements in a central and long-term decision-making process. The state's weakness is reflected in Pakistan's low ranking on almost every governance indicator -- crime, corruption and tax evasion, for instance -- as well as by its presence in the Failed State Index, where it just entered the Top 10 and acquired "critical" status.
Basic reform has to reduce the military's disproportionate and increasingly influential role in governance, and that may be very hard to achieve. Even if civilian competence is allowed to grow, it will take years, if not decades, and will require a long period of peace before it is up to the task. The media, judiciary and political parties all have an important role to play, but also suffer from their own internal weaknesses. They are thus, by themselves, incapable of reversing the political pattern of alternation between weak, unstable democratic governments and a benign authoritarianism, usually led by the army. This is likely to continue to erode Pakistan's governance over the next five years.
A final cluster looks at Pakistan's international environment. While Pakistanis may have an exaggerated view of the pernicious role played by outsiders, four external actors and two trends do shape Pakistan to a worrisome degree.
First, of the many factors complicating any forecasts of Pakistan's future, Afghanistan is certainly near the top. It affects relations with the United States and has a potential influence on Pakistan's Pashtun population. A Taliban victory there would be regarded by Pakistan's domestic Islamic extremists as a civilizational victory. For its part, the Pakistani military will also resist giving up its immense ambitions in Afghanistan, including significant influence -- if not control -- over Kabul in order to achieve its longstanding desire to balance India there.
Second, with regard to Washington, relations with the United States have deteriorated drastically, as has the image of the U.S. in Pakistan. What is euphemistically called a "trust deficit" will continue to constrain another euphemism: the U.S.-Pakistan "partnership." Conspiracy theories about U.S. collusion with India and Israel to weaken Pakistan and seize its nuclear weapons are widely shared even at the highest echelons of the army. A recent poll found that, when asked to name Pakistan's major enemy, 59 percent of Pakistanischose the U.S., ahead of other perceived threats, including India (52 percent), the Taliban (34 percent) and al-Qaida (21 percent).
Third, China has established itself as the most influential player in Islamabad. Its popularity among elites and in most of the provinces, its economic penetration, and its comprehensive support for the security establishment in the form of military hardware and nuclear technology have translated into an ever-increasing leverage over Islamabad. This was most recently symbolized by the visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to Islamabad in December 2010.
Finally, Pakistani paranoia regarding India is likely to persist. The management of Pakistan's relations with India has proved to be a source of conflict between the country's civilian and military leaderships and has historically been a leading driver of regime change, with the army often regarding civilian leaders as being too soft toward India. Pakistan's ethnic cohesion is also strained by differences among its various provinces in the priority they accord to Kashmir and other conflicts with India, with Punjab normally being the most hawkish. Pakistan would probably be better off seeking a long-term accommodation with India today, before it grows weaker and India stronger. But some in Pakistan still believe that the use of terrorism, carried out under the umbrella of a threat of nuclear escalation, will keep India off balance.
Two additional external trends will influence Pakistan's future: globalization and Islamabad's growing nuclear arsenal, which seems unconstrained by financial shortfall or strategic logic. The two are intertwined. Pakistan received almost all of its nuclear technology from other countries and took advantage of globalization to create purchasing networks that stretched around the world. It subsequently used these networks to share its nuclear technology with several customers. Pakistan's increasingly international profile indicates that more such incoming and outgoing flows of people, knowledge and technologies are to be expected, and not all of them will have benign intentions.
Pakistan in 2017: Six Scenarios
Given these four clusters, what can we expect for Pakistan on a five- to seven-year horizon? The study identifies a total of six scenarios, two of them being more likely and four others less probable.
The most likely scenario is "more of the same": an establishment-dominated Pakistan muddling through the various challenges and threats described above, with limited and erratic support from the outside. The military might take over, but only temporarily to effect short-term fixes. It will neither encourage nor tolerate deep reform, however, and civilians will be content with a limited political role. While seemingly sustainable in the short term, this effective surrendering to the volatilities of contingency could, in the long run, lead to a visible decline of Pakistan's integrity as a state.
The second likely scenario is that of "parallel Pakistans," in which the state would carry on as a recognizable central government, but some of the provinces and regions would succumb to centrifugal forces -- not in the form of a formal breakup, but on three latent dimensions: local political regime type; specific governance, economy and education models; and policies toward Islamist and separatist forces. De jure, Pakistan would live on, but de facto we would witness the emergence of political structures that contest, clash and overlap with the sovereignty of the federal center.
The four less likely scenarios include "democratic consolidation" based on an agreement between the two dominant parties, with the army accepting a permanently recessed role; "breakaway and fragmentation" after the disintegration of the army, either through a war or ethnic and sectarian differences; "civil or military authoritarianism" based on a centralized modernizing agenda or charismatic leader; and an "army-led revolution," along the lines of the Turkish or Indonesian experiences.
Overall, the interplay between the contested fields within Pakistan and the integrity of the Pakistani state will be determinative. It will be possible to measure this tension by Islamabad's future willingness and capacity to correct course and reverse trends along six crucial dimensions: dealing quickly with economic issues; rebuilding state institutions; creating effective and coherent governance at the top; breaking the cycle of the "begging bowl" dependency; avoiding new crises with India; and resisting the temptation to further appease Islamists.
A Diverse Menu of Policy Options
The fact that increasingly radical policy suggestions for Pakistan are getting more attention and leverage in Washington is a worrisome indication of how close the United States is to giving up on the country. Two suggestions stand out: Ambassador Robert Blackwill's "plan B," calling for a de facto partition of Afghanistan, which would necessarily lead to a greater Pashtunistan with territories carved out on the Pakistani side of the border and Ralph Peters' provocative map that redesigns the political borders of the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, reducing Pakistan to a rump of Punjab and parts of Sindh. Others talk of a strike against Pakistan should another terror attack be launched from its territory on the United States.
Instead of thinking along these lines, the United States should explore alternative scenarios and design a long-term Pakistan policy that is more than a mere derivation of Washington's immediate priorities in Afghanistan. For all the reasons and scenarios developed above, Pakistan cannot just be wished away: If nothing is done now, it will probably re-emerge as an even bigger problem and a more troubled country in the future.
The Western powers, Japan and India therefore need to develop a concerted strategy that will strengthen reform-minded and democratic forces in Pakistan, encourage the military to remain in a recessed role, help improve the Pakistani economy and generate more resources to address vital domestic needs.
This does not mean that the United States must involve itself in running the country or that it should get entangled in negotiations between Pakistan's military and political actors, which would be both costly and risky. There are good intermediate options, such as Thomas Friedman's proposal to disengage from South Asia and focus on offshore balancingbased on punctual "corrective" interventions. Other options worth exploring on the policy menu include encouraging India to supplant Pakistan in Afghanistan; containing Pakistan regionally; facilitating an India-Pakistan settlement on Kashmir; or just continuing the current cluster of policies. A failed or fragmented Pakistan, though, is not an option and should be kept off the menu as long as possible.
It is hard to be optimistic that the West and the United States will get both Afghanistan and Pakistan "right," that India will suddenly pursue a conciliatory policy with regard to its neighbor or that the Pakistani elite -- especially the military -- will have both the intent and capacity to undertake a program of deep reforms. That leaves the current, and perhaps the least worst, cluster of policies. When it comes to Pakistan, we must hope for the best, but that should not keep us from at least thinking about the worst.
Tuesday, October 6, 2009
UN Pakistan offices shut after blast: spokeswoman
ISLAMABAD (AFP) – United Nations offices remained closed throughout Pakistan Tuesday after a suicide blast at the World Food Programme compound in Islamabad left five aid workers dead, a spokeswoman said.
The world body is reviewing its security measures after a man dressed in military uniform walked past cameras, metal detectors and guards and detonated explosives in the heavily-fortified office in the heart of the capital on Monday.
"We are assessing the security situation," said spokeswoman Ishrat Rizvi. "Today the offices are closed... we hope that the offices will be open soon."
Interior Minister Rehman Malik has blamed the blast on Taliban militants avenging a military push against them in northwest Swat valley, which was launched in late April and has left more than 2,000 militants dead. Related article: Blast shows Pakistan Taliban strength
He said the attacker managed to navigate the tough security by dressing in a paramilitary uniform and asking to use the toilet, thus managing to make it to the lobby to detonate about eight kilograms (17 pounds) of explosives.
Four Pakistanis and an Iraqi working for the WFP were killed.
Rizvi said their security team was assessing whether to reopen the offices on a day-by-day basis, but said they were committed to continuing their work.
"The closure of the offices will affect the operations but our effort and intention is to continue our humanitarian assistance," she told AFP.
No decisions had been taken yet over whether to remove any of about 2,000 UN staff working for at least 19 agencies across Pakistan.
The attack on a humanitarian target provoked worldwide outrage, with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon calling it "a terrible tragedy for the United Nations and the humanitarian community in Pakistan".
In New York, the UN Staff Union said in a statement it was "extremely concerned" that the world body had not implemented "all necessary safety and security arrangements to protect its staff."
It is the second time the UN community in Pakistan has been hit this year, with two employees from the refugee agency UNHCR and children's agency UNICEF killed in the June suicide bombing at a luxury hotel in northwest Peshawar.
ISLAMABAD (AFP) – United Nations offices remained closed throughout Pakistan Tuesday after a suicide blast at the World Food Programme compound in Islamabad left five aid workers dead, a spokeswoman said.
The world body is reviewing its security measures after a man dressed in military uniform walked past cameras, metal detectors and guards and detonated explosives in the heavily-fortified office in the heart of the capital on Monday.
"We are assessing the security situation," said spokeswoman Ishrat Rizvi. "Today the offices are closed... we hope that the offices will be open soon."
Interior Minister Rehman Malik has blamed the blast on Taliban militants avenging a military push against them in northwest Swat valley, which was launched in late April and has left more than 2,000 militants dead. Related article: Blast shows Pakistan Taliban strength
He said the attacker managed to navigate the tough security by dressing in a paramilitary uniform and asking to use the toilet, thus managing to make it to the lobby to detonate about eight kilograms (17 pounds) of explosives.
Four Pakistanis and an Iraqi working for the WFP were killed.
Rizvi said their security team was assessing whether to reopen the offices on a day-by-day basis, but said they were committed to continuing their work.
"The closure of the offices will affect the operations but our effort and intention is to continue our humanitarian assistance," she told AFP.
No decisions had been taken yet over whether to remove any of about 2,000 UN staff working for at least 19 agencies across Pakistan.
The attack on a humanitarian target provoked worldwide outrage, with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon calling it "a terrible tragedy for the United Nations and the humanitarian community in Pakistan".
In New York, the UN Staff Union said in a statement it was "extremely concerned" that the world body had not implemented "all necessary safety and security arrangements to protect its staff."
It is the second time the UN community in Pakistan has been hit this year, with two employees from the refugee agency UNHCR and children's agency UNICEF killed in the June suicide bombing at a luxury hotel in northwest Peshawar.
Tuesday, September 29, 2009
What is Terrorism?
In my view and understanding, terrorism is a callous act of violence or threat of violence applied to achieve a political change through terrorising people psychologica
lly and or maim or killings. According to Oxford English dictionary, the explanation is that “Terrorism is a practice of using violent and intimidating methods, especially to achieve political ends”.
In my view and understanding, terrorism is a callous act of violence or threat of violence applied to achieve a political change through terrorising people psychologica
lly and or maim or killings. According to Oxford English dictionary, the explanation is that “Terrorism is a practice of using violent and intimidating methods, especially to achieve political ends”.
Tuesday, August 25, 2009
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Field Security - Policy and Operations
Security Risk Management – Risk and Threat assessments for your Operations
Security Plan – Develop Security contingency and Business continuity plans
Protective Security
Investigations – Security and Fraud, surveillance and under cover operations
Security Training – For management, staff and field personnel
Incident Management – Responding to and manage crisis incidents
Security Vetting - Background checks on employees
Close Protection of Executives and VIPs – travelling to and working in conflict areas globally
Our professional consultants have hundred years of experience collectively, having served with specialised agencies of the Governments, United Nations, INGO’s and Corporate entities globally in manmade and natural disasters ranging from Africa, Middle East, Former Soviet Union, South America and Asia-Pacific regions. They come with extensive experience, skills and network enables us to provide the best professional and timely service to our clients globally.
In today’s world, both business and non – profit organisations are constantly faced with security threats from organised criminals, politically motivated violent groups and terrorists. Hence its crucial to obtain professional Security vetting of your staff members, train your personnel to conduct business safely in insecure environments, drive your management to asses threats and mitigate measures, and to manage crisis incidents with minimal loss, and be able to recover and continue operations.
We have the expertise to identify and address these issues, whilst your management focuses on their primary business/operations without having to dedicate their valuable time and effort to Security issues.
We strive for continuous excellence and client satisfaction in our efforts to secure your people, business, assets and interests.
Contact us today on;
Telephone: +61 404 500 535
Email: c3srma@hotmail.com
Tuesday, June 30, 2009
Tuesday, January 6, 2009
Terrorism
South Asia Expert Sees Obama 'Redefining The War On Terror'
March 27, 2009
Pakistani writer and analyst Ahmed Rashid has covered Afghanistan and Pakistan for the past three decades. Rashid has also recently advised Richard Holbrooke, U.S. President Barack Obama's special envoy for Pakistan and Afghanistan. He spoke with RFE/RL correspondent Abubakar Siddique about U.S. President Barack Obama's new strategy for Afghanistan and the region.
RFE/RL: Is deploying more troops the right answer to Afghanistan's complex security challenge?
Ahmed Rashid: What we are going to see is a surge that is going to be including a lot more troops, but also a lot more aid, reconstruction, development, [and] building capacity of the government, speeding up the building of the army and the police and the bureaucracy. So I think, taken together, we are not just talking about a surge in troops; we are talking about a much more comprehensive strategy that will really be rectifying the kind of mistakes and what was missing from the [George W.] Bush administration's agenda.
RFE/RL: Does the unveiling of this strategy mean a paradigm shift in what was called the global war on terrorism to what some in Washington are already calling the Overseas Contingency Operations Strategy?
Rashid: Yes, what we are going to see is a redefinition of the war on terror. I don't think we are going to see this blanket terminology applied to all groups -- nationalists, extremist Islamic, left wing -- everybody who comes in gets a label. I don't think we are going to see that.
We are going to see a much more sophisticated approach wherein Al-Qaeda is going to be targeted and isolated. And I think that is the correct way to go. And that of course, will allow people in the U.S. government to talk to other [militant] groups -- for example, the Kashmiris, the Taliban, [and] Hamas. And these groups should be talked to.
Prospect Of Talks?
RFE/RL: How do you see the practical implementation of the idea to talk to the Taliban or a strategy to reconcile some of them?
Rashid: I think a lot of Taliban who are not necessarily fighting for ideological reasons -- who are not fighting to put bombs in New York, who are not fighting because they are loyal to Bin Laden -- they are fighting for very mundane issues, [essentially] local issues. Their brother was killed, their house was attacked by American soldiers -- local grievances. They are disappointed and disillusioned with the government.
In the light of all this, it is quite easy to understand why a lot of Afghans have taken up arms against the government and against the Americans. But I think they can be brought back and incentives [and] pressures can be used to bring them back.
RFE/RL: How does this strategy address the alleged corruption of a lot of figures in the Afghan government that has tarnished the presidency of Hamid Karzai?
Rashid: Well, I think that really needs to be addressed -- not just corruption, but those involved in drug trafficking, and they could be members of his own family. He will need to address that before the next election because, I think, these are the kinds of allegations, which will be made by the opposition candidates, which will carry a lot of weight as far as the people are concerned. And he needs to do something about it.
Pakistan And The Region
RFE/RL: Do you think the new strategy can effectively address the competition between regional powers, particularly India and Pakistan, which contributes to instability in Afghanistan?
Rashid: I think the international community has to address that. And they have to be prompt about it and they have to get on to the backs of, hopefully, the more improved situation in Afghanistan to convince the local people that they need the support of the neighboring countries.
RFE/RL: Do you think the new strategy can prevail on the various power centers in Pakistan and rally them behind with the clear goal of defeating extremism in Pakistan and ensuring that it is not a threat to Afghanistan?
Rashid: Frankly, I don't. I think the Pakistani leadership right now is very, very fragmented. It is uninspired by the real issues which affect Pakistanis -- in other words, terrorism, extremism, the lack of security, and the lack of jobs. We have not seen the Pakistani leadership come together to offer leadership or a vision for the future or a path to the future.
And we have also seen a very demoralized [Pakistani] military. The military is not offering any kind of leadership role either here.
We have an elite, frankly, a ruling elite that is virtually in the state of collapse, and is not willing to take the kind of leadership role and the kind of risks involved in standing up to the Taliban. And that puts the country in a very poor position.
RFE/RL: While the United States is likely to increase civilian aid to Pakistan, it is expected to tie military aid to the army's performance against Taliban and Al-Qaeda, do you think it risks alienating Pakistan's powerful military establishment?
Rashid: Certainly, conditions on that aid will anger the army. But at the same time, I hope, there will be sufficient aid for the civilian sector. I think if the civilian sector can be faced with additional aid, money, support for everything that has gone missing -- I think the civilians will be able to convince the military that if there is a loss of aid for the military, at least, it is being made up on the civilian side.
But clearly, there is a lot of anti-Americanism in the army. There is a lot of sympathy for the Taliban. All this has to be balanced out by the army chief. And obviously, American aid is going to play a critical role in that.
RFE/RL: In the past, you have recommended the integration of Pakistan's Pashtun border region, particularly the restive Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), into the country's political and economic mainstream, to undermine militancy and extremism. Do you see it happening soon?
Rashid: One of the greatest failures of the Pakistani civilian leadership has been its refusal, despite many appeals by the public, by the Pashtuns, and, of course, by the former assassinated Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, to set out a vision of the future for FATA; to at least announce the desire of the political elite to bring FATA into the mainstream, to bring it within the constitution of Pakistan, and to stop making it this irrelevant sort of border post which has no laws and which is ruled by the gun. We have had this [Pakistan] People's Party government in power for a year, and they have still not offered any kind of future for the people of FATA. And it think that is incredibly tragic. Now, it's not entirely their fault because it seems very clearly that the military is against this.
RFE/RL: While the United States has a military and diplomatic presence in Afghanistan, how challenging will it be to implement these new plans on the ground in Pakistan?
Rashid: Pakistan is a very, very fragmented society right now. And it's not a place where American opinion is taken very seriously. Unfortunately, Pakistan and the people are likely to respond quite negatively to the Obama proposals because of the conditionalities that are being set up. We are dealing here with a very serious crisis in Pakistan. And only time will tell how this is going to be resolved.
Source: http://www.rferl.org/content/South_Asia_Expert_Sees_Obama_Redefining_The_War_On_Terror/1563203.html
March 27, 2009
Pakistani writer and analyst Ahmed Rashid has covered Afghanistan and Pakistan for the past three decades. Rashid has also recently advised Richard Holbrooke, U.S. President Barack Obama's special envoy for Pakistan and Afghanistan. He spoke with RFE/RL correspondent Abubakar Siddique about U.S. President Barack Obama's new strategy for Afghanistan and the region.
RFE/RL: Is deploying more troops the right answer to Afghanistan's complex security challenge?
Ahmed Rashid: What we are going to see is a surge that is going to be including a lot more troops, but also a lot more aid, reconstruction, development, [and] building capacity of the government, speeding up the building of the army and the police and the bureaucracy. So I think, taken together, we are not just talking about a surge in troops; we are talking about a much more comprehensive strategy that will really be rectifying the kind of mistakes and what was missing from the [George W.] Bush administration's agenda.
RFE/RL: Does the unveiling of this strategy mean a paradigm shift in what was called the global war on terrorism to what some in Washington are already calling the Overseas Contingency Operations Strategy?
Rashid: Yes, what we are going to see is a redefinition of the war on terror. I don't think we are going to see this blanket terminology applied to all groups -- nationalists, extremist Islamic, left wing -- everybody who comes in gets a label. I don't think we are going to see that.
We are going to see a much more sophisticated approach wherein Al-Qaeda is going to be targeted and isolated. And I think that is the correct way to go. And that of course, will allow people in the U.S. government to talk to other [militant] groups -- for example, the Kashmiris, the Taliban, [and] Hamas. And these groups should be talked to.
Prospect Of Talks?
RFE/RL: How do you see the practical implementation of the idea to talk to the Taliban or a strategy to reconcile some of them?
Rashid: I think a lot of Taliban who are not necessarily fighting for ideological reasons -- who are not fighting to put bombs in New York, who are not fighting because they are loyal to Bin Laden -- they are fighting for very mundane issues, [essentially] local issues. Their brother was killed, their house was attacked by American soldiers -- local grievances. They are disappointed and disillusioned with the government.
In the light of all this, it is quite easy to understand why a lot of Afghans have taken up arms against the government and against the Americans. But I think they can be brought back and incentives [and] pressures can be used to bring them back.
RFE/RL: How does this strategy address the alleged corruption of a lot of figures in the Afghan government that has tarnished the presidency of Hamid Karzai?
Rashid: Well, I think that really needs to be addressed -- not just corruption, but those involved in drug trafficking, and they could be members of his own family. He will need to address that before the next election because, I think, these are the kinds of allegations, which will be made by the opposition candidates, which will carry a lot of weight as far as the people are concerned. And he needs to do something about it.
Pakistan And The Region
RFE/RL: Do you think the new strategy can effectively address the competition between regional powers, particularly India and Pakistan, which contributes to instability in Afghanistan?
Rashid: I think the international community has to address that. And they have to be prompt about it and they have to get on to the backs of, hopefully, the more improved situation in Afghanistan to convince the local people that they need the support of the neighboring countries.
RFE/RL: Do you think the new strategy can prevail on the various power centers in Pakistan and rally them behind with the clear goal of defeating extremism in Pakistan and ensuring that it is not a threat to Afghanistan?
Rashid: Frankly, I don't. I think the Pakistani leadership right now is very, very fragmented. It is uninspired by the real issues which affect Pakistanis -- in other words, terrorism, extremism, the lack of security, and the lack of jobs. We have not seen the Pakistani leadership come together to offer leadership or a vision for the future or a path to the future.
And we have also seen a very demoralized [Pakistani] military. The military is not offering any kind of leadership role either here.
We have an elite, frankly, a ruling elite that is virtually in the state of collapse, and is not willing to take the kind of leadership role and the kind of risks involved in standing up to the Taliban. And that puts the country in a very poor position.
RFE/RL: While the United States is likely to increase civilian aid to Pakistan, it is expected to tie military aid to the army's performance against Taliban and Al-Qaeda, do you think it risks alienating Pakistan's powerful military establishment?
Rashid: Certainly, conditions on that aid will anger the army. But at the same time, I hope, there will be sufficient aid for the civilian sector. I think if the civilian sector can be faced with additional aid, money, support for everything that has gone missing -- I think the civilians will be able to convince the military that if there is a loss of aid for the military, at least, it is being made up on the civilian side.
But clearly, there is a lot of anti-Americanism in the army. There is a lot of sympathy for the Taliban. All this has to be balanced out by the army chief. And obviously, American aid is going to play a critical role in that.
RFE/RL: In the past, you have recommended the integration of Pakistan's Pashtun border region, particularly the restive Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), into the country's political and economic mainstream, to undermine militancy and extremism. Do you see it happening soon?
Rashid: One of the greatest failures of the Pakistani civilian leadership has been its refusal, despite many appeals by the public, by the Pashtuns, and, of course, by the former assassinated Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, to set out a vision of the future for FATA; to at least announce the desire of the political elite to bring FATA into the mainstream, to bring it within the constitution of Pakistan, and to stop making it this irrelevant sort of border post which has no laws and which is ruled by the gun. We have had this [Pakistan] People's Party government in power for a year, and they have still not offered any kind of future for the people of FATA. And it think that is incredibly tragic. Now, it's not entirely their fault because it seems very clearly that the military is against this.
RFE/RL: While the United States has a military and diplomatic presence in Afghanistan, how challenging will it be to implement these new plans on the ground in Pakistan?
Rashid: Pakistan is a very, very fragmented society right now. And it's not a place where American opinion is taken very seriously. Unfortunately, Pakistan and the people are likely to respond quite negatively to the Obama proposals because of the conditionalities that are being set up. We are dealing here with a very serious crisis in Pakistan. And only time will tell how this is going to be resolved.
Source: http://www.rferl.org/content/South_Asia_Expert_Sees_Obama_Redefining_The_War_On_Terror/1563203.html
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